British Army report says Iraq war was badly planned

Not a big surprise, in total, but the specifics are interesting. Following Bush's example, the reports from the British "boots on the ground" were "hopelessly optimistic". As I've said before, military campaigns are not football matches; cheerleading cannot take the place of sober analysis. You simply cannot make decisions based on intelligence that has been shaped to put a positive spin on the situation.

Also, as has been widely suspected for years, the U.S. drove the operation with its own agenda with little or no regard for the British situation. Everything was planned for a quick victory scenario, with no clear planning for the occupation beyond victory speeches and heroic claims. Plan "B" was simply more of the same. Thus, despite the boundless optimism, the peace was lost within 100 days. Plan "B" turned into a snarling campaign of treason accusations against critics who noticed that things weren't going as well as expected.

And, of course, the infamous Decider secrecy was imposed on the British, which worked against the planning by excluding anyone who wasn't "hopelessly optimistic". This is what happens when loyalty is your primary consideration; you only hear what you want to hear and only plan for the best possible outcome.

While this was a secret report that was leaked from British Army, one can only wonder if the American military is engaging in similar introspection. Perhaps the Bush Administration "yes men" and minders have prevented our military from learning from this debacle.

story from the Daily Telegraph:

Iraq war was badly planned, says Army

Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent

Last Updated: 2:16am GMT 04/11/2007

A leaked internal Army report has delivered an unprecedented attack on the planning and execution of the war in Iraq.

The document, which openly condemns British and US foreign policy, says that "leaders should not start an operation without thinking through the options and implications of their plans".

It claims that widespread planning failures in the post-war phase led to the peace in Iraq being lost by September 2003, within the first 100 days of the occupation.

The report, marked "restricted", adds that many senior officers now believe that the Government has developed a "bureaucratic approach to problem solving" and is "no longer capable" of running large scale military operations such as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The 16-page document describes how the Iraq campaign was undermined by a lack of planning, resources, funding and intelligence.

"The evidence shows that too little planning was done for Operation Telic [the codename for the war in Iraq] particularly on the non-military side, and that too few resources, both human and financial were allocated to the post-war situation," it says.

The report, drawn up in late 2006, suggests that Britain and the US may have breeched the Geneva Convention by failing properly to conduct their duties as "occupying powers".

It also says that assessments by British commanders on the success of their reconstruction efforts were "hopelessly optimistic". The secrecy surrounding the operation, the report claims, meant that government departments were unable to plan for the post-war phase until December 2002 - just three months before the start of the invasion.

The report, entitled An Analysis of Operation Telic, makes no apology for the stark criticisms contained within it nor for the embarrassment it will cause the Government.

Instead, the document, which is part of a wider study called Theme Zero, says that the "Army has a duty to learn from experience". The report states:

• The British headquarters suffered from a lack of good quality officers

• Lack of planning put Britain and the US, as occupying powers, in "breach" of the Geneva Convention

• Lack of planning resulted in delays before essential reconstruction could begin

• Not enough funding was requested by senior commanders or approved by the Treasury

• British commanders were forced to work to an ideologically driven US timetable

• Restrictive operational security meant that few people in Government were involved in planning.

The report also says that the main focus of US commanders was the stabilisation of Baghdad and that they were "unresponsive" to the concerns of their British counter-parts for the worsening situation in southern Iraq.

One officer wrote that the Britain was committed to an ideologically driven US timetable, adding: "The train was on Grand Central station, and was leaving at a time which we did not control."

The report says "the multinational headquarters suffered from a lack of good quality British officers with formal staff training", a situation which persisted until the military secretary, who advises the secretary of state for defence, intervened to ensure that officers of the correct calibre- were posted to Iraq.

Crucially, the document claims that the British were unable to win the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqis because they failed to understand Arab culture. One officer wrote: "We may be able to influence their minds but we will never win the (Islamic) heart.