Yet the fundamental crux of the surge was that Iraqi troops would take the lead in kicking in doors and shutting down the sectarian militias. As Bush said the Jan. 10 speech in which he proposed the surge:
Now let me explain the main elements of this effort: The Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital. The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades across Baghdad's nine districts. When these forces are fully deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades committed to this effort, along with local police. These Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations — conducting patrols and setting up checkpoints, and going door-to-door to gain the trust of Baghdad residents.
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Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.
And Petraeus' withdrawal plan relies on the Iraqi troops stepping up to the plate, as well. If the plan fails, the result will be another stop-loss. The sole carrot that Petraeus' report offered would vanish. Republicans would be left with nothing but more scary talk, pictures of eagles, and accusations of treason. The best that the Republicans can hope for is a return to the situation that called for the surge in the first place. The White House has a pretty awful record of coming up with best-case scenario results.
Obviously, judging from his Jan. 10 address, Bush thought we could train the Iraqi military quickly enough to take over by the time the September report was due. Now, however, we are rebuked for ever thinking that this could have happened, that this is unrealistic, that it takes time to train the required number of troops.
Why, then, did we base the surge strategy on a fully-trained, fully-manned Iraqi military?
It takes nine weeks to train a U.S. marine. Nine months later, we have fewer Iraqi battalions ready than we had in January. Eh? The answer is that two battalions got killed since then. So this plan hinges on no more Iraqi military casualties? How realistic is that?
Bush said in his September report speech that by December, "our troops will shift from leading operations to partnering with Iraqi forces to eventually overwatching those forces." This is essentially what he said we would be doing in January when he proposed the surge. It failed. It failed, in large part, because the Iraqi military has failed. And now we are going to try using this failed Iraqi military once again to get our troops home.
And so wait we until March, when this whole plan will be trotted out again. Again the plan will be for the Iraqi military to take over for the U.S. troops. Again we will be told that we are "increasing training efforts". Again we will be told that it takes time to build the Iraqi military, and again no one will ask why we thought the Iraqi military would be able to take over if we also thought at the same time that we could not train those troops quickly enough to take over.
full story from the Boston Globe
Petraeus war plan is doubted
Data show Iraqi units unprepared
WASHINGTON - Despite his conclusion that Iraqi units can replace US combat troops who will return home by the end of the year, statistics produced by General David Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, indicate that there are now fewer Iraqi units that can operate independently than there were at the beginning of the year.
As a result, some US and Iraqi officials are skeptical that Petraeus's plan, which gives the Iraqis more responsibility as US troops leave, can actually work.
That plan, they say, is overly optimistic and could jeopardize the fragile gains made in recent months by the "surge" of 30,000 additional troops President Bush sent to Iraq earlier this year. The officials point to the persistent lack of readiness of the Iraqi Army and national police, as well as the fear that many members of the Iraqi forces are more loyal to their sectarian factions than to their own central government.
Iraqi forces "are not ready necessarily to hold areas by themselves that have been cleared out" by American combat troops, said Kenneth Katzman, Middle East specialist at the Congressional Research Service, an arm of Congress. "Whatever gains there were from the surge, I believe they will be eroded. Once US forces are thinned out, the insurgents will regroup."
Some in the US military even argued that the upcoming withdrawal of 20,000 troops, which President Bush announced in a nationwide speech Thursday night, should be postponed until the spring, when Iraqi units might be better able to take on more responsibility, according to officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity and were involved in the deliberations.
The number of Iraqi Army and police battalions considered ready to conduct combat operations without help from the United States has declined from 15 at the beginning of the year to 12 this month, according to data that Petraeus provided to Congress last week.
Though the general was on Capitol Hill as part of two days of intense, high-profile hearings on the progress of the war, the readiness of Iraqi troops received scant attention from Petraeus or lawmakers.
At the same time, Pentagon assessments show that the number of Iraqi battalions considered "not ready" increased from 13 in November 2006 to 43 this past summer.
But the Petraeus plan, which Bush adopted last week, depends on a sufficient number of capable Iraqi units replacing at least 20,000 US combat troops that are set to return home beginning this month.
Bush said in his speech that by December, "our troops will shift from leading operations to partnering with Iraqi forces to eventually overwatching those forces."
Yet many American military officials now acknowledge that when Iraqi forces took the lead in 2006 in a series of operations known as Together Forward I and II, the strategy failed, in part because of abuses committed by largely Shia Muslim Iraqi troops against minority Sunnis and their inability to hold area cleared of insurgents.
"In Together Forward we cleared neighborhoods but had no strategy to hold neighborhoods," said retired Army General Jack Keane, who has been a key adviser to the Bush team on Iraq strategy and was an architect of the surge method. "It has been the problem for the last three plus years. We did the same thing in Fallujah and Samarra and we never had a strategy for protecting the population after we ran the bad guys out."
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Fred Kagan, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute who was also an early proponent of the surge, said that the Petraeus-Bush plan could backfire.
"I think it is possible to reduce forces without jeopardizing our success, but I think we have to acknowledge that it is increasing our risks against the possibility of unforeseen developments," Kagan said.
But Keane said Petraeus and his commanders have assured him that there is a backup plan: stop bringing troops home if the violence increases.
"These forces will be redrawn based on conditions on the ground," Keane said. "If the enemy starts to act in ways we had not foreseen . . . the forces that were to be drawn down will not be drawn down."