Army of Dude is a blog written a soldier named Alex currently serving in Diyala, the province that neocons wax ecstatic over as proof that the surge is "working". This particular pair of "boots on the ground", however, sees things quite differently from the press releases written by commanders trying hard not to be the next Shinseki.
I strongly encourage you to take a moment to read not only the entire post in Alex's blog, but the other entries. One point of interest is his post detailing the pressure to re-enlist.
In the excerpt that follows, Alex outlines possible nominees for the stupidest mistakes made by the military in the areas he has served. Emphases are mine.
Working with 1920s – A Sunni insurgent group we’ve been battling for months, responsible for the death of my friend and numerous attacks, agreed to fight Al Qaeda alongside us. Since then, they’ve grown into a much more organized, lethal force. They use this organization to steal cars and intimidate and torture the local population, or anyone they accuse of being linked to Al Qaeda. The Gestapo of the 21st century, sanctioned by the United States Army.
The Surge – The beefing up of ground forces in Iraq at the beginning of the year, started by the 82nd Airborne. Unit deployments were moved up several months to maintain a higher level of boots on the ground to quell the Baghdad situation. What most don’t realize is the amount of actual fighting troops in a brigade, something in the area of 2,000 soldiers in a brigade of 5,000 depending on what unit it is. So for every 2,000 fighters, there are 3,000 pencil pushers sucking up resources in every brigade that was surged. A logistical nightmare that, surprise, failed miserably. The increase of troops in Baghdad pushed the insurgents to rural areas (like Diyala), hence our move here in March. The surge was nothing more than a thorn in the side of nomadic fighters having to move thirty five miles while the generals watched Baghdad with stubborn eyes.
Two Companies Clearing Baqubah – Which brings us to the next nominee. Since Baghdad was the showcase of the war and Baqubah was brimming with super IEDs taking our Bradleys and Abrams tanks, it was decided that a unit needed to be sent there to assist the cavalry unit who averaged a death per week. But how many to send? Someone, somehow, somewhere decided that two companies of Strykers would be adequate to take down what Al Qaeda had deemed their headquarters in Iraq. What came about this oversight? Two hours into the first mission, my friend was killed in a massive IED blast that busted the hell out of the squad leader’s face, resulting in traumatic brain injury and facial reconstruction surgery. The vehicle commander tore his ACL from the concussion. Shrapnel being thrown around the inside of the truck caught one dude in the knee as a dude in the back hatch got rattled around, bruising his back as the other in the hatch was thrown completely out the vehicle. He’s been quiet since then, and was sent home soon after. Returning fire from us and the Bradleys killed an untold number of kids unlucky enough to be in the school next to our position. A wrecker sent out to pick up the destroyed Stryker was the next victim of an IED explosion, killing two men inside. Two more wreckers were sent out, one for the Stryker, one for the now totaled wrecker. As we pulled out that evening, local Iraqis, men, women and children, danced in celebration by the massive crater where the Stryker had been. At once we realized reinforcements were needed but we didn’t get any for two more months. Many more men were killed because we were stretched to our operational breaking point. But there was always more to do. Whoever made the decision to send less than an infantry battalion should be in jail right now.
The Extension – This wasn’t too much of a surprise to us, as we knew in the back of our minds that an extension was in our future. What was surprising was the fact that everyone in Iraq was extended to fifteen month deployments. It was meant to give every unit at least a year in between deployments, as some were coming back to Iraq after only ten months back in the states. Now at the end, it’s not hard to assess the achievements of our three extra months. It seems at a quick glance that we pacified the city, street by street. There was a lull in American deaths because, simply, we absorbed all the bomb blasts or found the IEDs before they could detonate on us. As deadly as they are, deep buried IEDs must take a lot of time to build and emplace. The ones used against us were meant for the cavalry unit, who didn’t have the manpower to patrol the streets like we have been. After we arrived, there were few bombs that haven’t been sitting in the ground for several months already. The enemy ran out of ways to kill us until the ingenious idea of putting bombs in houses took hold. Instead of blowing us up in armored vehicles, they thought about doing it inside an abandoned house. What kills you isn’t the bomb, but the foundation of the house that comes crashing down after the explosion. Wires and triggers are hidden behind doors or underneath rugs, so when we go out and clear blocks and blocks of houses, there’s a pressure plate waiting for you at the foot of the stairs. Only your eyes can save you at this point. That tactic has been born from our proclivity to redundantly clear neighborhoods, and the extension is guilty of claiming lives of men who are running on too little sleep, walking into house after house in the desert heat. When you’re worried about how much water you have left and the trucks are too far away to get more, you tend to miss the trip wire in the dark stairwell. Twelve month deployments are a burden on your body and mind. Asking men for three more months is not only unfair but deadly.
Seven Men Killed At The Same Time – Finally, one of the lowest, saddest points of the deployment came in May. One night, a helicopter spotted several men gathered in the road with a large object. Permission was asked to fire a Hellfire missile at them, as they were obvious IED emplacers. Permission was emphatically denied, but someone decided that a Stryker platoon should head out there anyway to check it out. In tow was a Russian reporter. On a road called Trash Alley, they hit a massive deep buried IED. Everyone in the truck except the driver, six Americans and one Russian, dead. And they didn’t need to be there at all. A helicopter could have killed the insurgents with breathtaking ease. Instead, those guys and the one with the detonator got away in the night. Justice was never done.
War supporters always tell us to "listen to the boots on the ground". What goes unsaid, however, are the consequences for those "boots" who fail to repeat the scripted lines.
As for me, I started to sign these entries with my initials long ago to avoid detection by superiors. I could and still can get in trouble for what I’ve written. Lately this blog has been passed around to dudes of every rank, and those who would be punishing me have become readers.
...and also:
In the future, I want my children to grow up with the belief that what I did here was wrong, in a society that doesn’t deem that idea unpatriotic.
This soldier's post is a heart-breaking read and I sincerely hope that nobody reading this sees this an opportunity to punish someone who has served their country but fails to squawk like a parrot when cued. The Republican's crazy "dissent is treason" mantra should be excepted in the case of the troops, but sadly it is the case where this belief is applied most stringently. "Support the troops", my ass. They mean "support the troops that say what they are told to say, and punish those who are brave enough to speak the truth".
Like most war testimonials, this one tells a story of someone fighting for their friends rather than some glorious cause. That's what makes me deeply suspicious of accounts from tools like Michael Yon, who is forever spinning tales of soldiers spouting the Party line and saying things that sound like they come from Tony Snow's mouth. Maybe officers talk like that, officers seeking quick promotion with little regard for the men under their command, that is. The "grunts", however, don't have time for that and don't see any future in it. They know better than to speak their minds around such officers, which only serves to reinforce the fantasy world of these craven toadies. This lot was still chirping away with glowing reports of 'enemy' body counts and inevitable success in Vietnam right up to the bitter end. Do we never learn?
I think that the right-wing had better brace themselves for more stories such as Alex's when the surge is over. These guys won't keep their mouths shut forever, especially once they find out to what devious lengths the Bush Administration will go to when denying them their benefits and care. Once they start to look for a job and find Republican fundies mouthing "we support your service" tonelessly while tossing their resumes in the trash, they will surely wise up to the immense fraud, lies, and hypocrisy at the foundation of the neocon's 'support' for the troops. Having built up the troops as a nearly angelic group beyond reproach or criticism, the Republicans will find it very difficult indeed to suddenly label these men and women as 'traitors' and 'defeatists'.
The major strategic "progress" of the surge has been in enlisting the sectarian militias in the effort to fight Al-Qaeda, which somehow is the most important thing.
Not only does this tactic glaringly point out the failure of the Iraqi military and police, but it also puts us directly in league with those who have tortured and killed innocent Iraqis for years in a short-term bid to tackle a relatively minor cause of the massive instability in Iraq. It was the (Iraqi) police and military who were supposed to take the lead in the surge, not our troops and certainly not the gangs that the surge was supposed to disarm. These sectarian militias are little more than street gangs, and their objectives are not nobler or more evolved than common street gangs, yet our alliance with them is the major reason behind the "pacification". In an earlier post, Alex poignantly describes an exchange with one of these militia's members:
For now, our relationship with 1920 is one of mutual distrust and hatred, a sign of the times. A conversation between a member of my platoon and a 1920 source is ripe with foreboding on the future of this partnership, and of the war to come.
“Do you want to kill me?” asked the soldier.
“Yes,” replied the source, coldly and without emotion. “But not today.”
Does this sound like a tactic we can put our faith in? Or does it sound like a short-term move to create the illusion of long-term success while a report is due? I wish those who support the surge and claim that it's "working" would explain how it will deal the sectarian militias once the reason for this alliance of convenience disappears. It is nothing short of madness to keep on repeating that Al-Qaeda is the big problem facing Iraq, but that is exactly what we gambled the farm on. Instead, for all of this compromise with the gangs, we have merely managed to keep Al-Qaeda moving around. There is no "reconciliation"; there is only a temporary distraction that the Iraqi government, police, and military are completely squandering. And we have bought this sham of success with the extension of soldiers like Alex.
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